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Abstract
We develop a theory of ‘behavioral communities’ and the ‘atomic structure’ of net-
works. We define atoms to be groups of agents whose behaviors always match each
other in a set of coordination games played on the network. This provides a microfoun-
dation for a method of detecting communities in social and economic networks. We
provide theoretical results characterizing such behavior-based communities and atomic
structures and discussing their properties in large random networks. We also provide an
algorithm for identifying behavioral communities. We discuss applications including:
a method of estimating underlying preferences by observing behavioral conventions in
data, and optimally seeding diffusion processes when there are peer interactions and
homophily. We illustrate the techniques with applications to high school friendship
networks and rural village networks.
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1 Introduction
Networks shape who influences whom in a society. Strong divides driven by homophily and
other forces result in communities of people who are more connected with each other than
with outsiders (e.g., see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)). These divides enable
different communities to maintain different behaviors, norms, and cultures. Differences in
behaviors range from relatively innocuous ones – such as whether you shakes hands or kiss a
friend on the cheek, and even how many times and which cheek you start with, when meeting
them – to more consequential ones such as whether one cheats on taxes, how much a child
studies in school, which profession one pursues, and so forth (e.g., see Jackson (2018, forth-
coming)). Understanding how these “behavioral communities” depend on network structure
is the subject of this paper.
Our approach is to define communities according to which people influence each other’s
behaviors in the network. In particular, we examine settings in which there are complemen-
tarities in peoples’ behaviors - for instance as in the adoption of a new technology, or the
maintenance of some norm of behavior or culture.
Our approach is based on drawing a cut in the network if there is at least one situation
(Nash equilibrium) in which people on one side of the cut adopt a behavior and on the other
side of the network do not. The intersections of all these cuts provide the basic building
blocks or “atoms” of behavior that are possible in a given network. This is what we use
to define a community. This means that we consider two people in the same community if
and only if they behave the same way in every one of some set of behavioral conventions.
This is a minimalist notion of community, but given that these form the basic atoms of
possible behaviors, our communities provide the building blocks that can aggregate into
larger norms or culture in different combinations. Most obviously, our analysis shows how
network structure determines which norms of behavior and cultural conventions are feasible.
By understanding those basic building blocks - the ‘atoms’ or ‘communities’ in our analysis -
we learn about the possible norms and behavior contagions in a society and how they depend
on the behavior and network in question.
We examine canonical settings in which people choose between two behaviors: adopting
a technology or not, buying a product or not, joining a movement or not, smoking or not,
engaging in criminal activities or not, going to college or not, etc. We consider two different
ways in which they might be influenced by their peers. One case is in which their decision
to undertake a behavior depends on the fraction of their friends who are undertaking the
behavior, and the other is in which their decision depends on the absolute number of friends
who are undertaking a behavior. Each of these is relevant in different applications.
The atoms that emerge from these definitions are fascinatingly complex objects that
uncover relationships in the network structure that are not otherwise obvious. Some atoms
emerge from closely knit groups whose high internal density and low external density tie
their behaviors inexorably together. However, other atoms emerge because of parallels in
nodes’ positions, despite the fact that those nodes are not connected to each other and do
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not even have friends in common – nonetheless the nodes’ positions lead them to take similar
behaviors in all situations. Our main theorems then provide results on how the communities
that result under these relate to block structures in large random graphs, and how they
differ across the fractional versus absolute setting. Fractional-threshold-based atoms tend
to subsets of blocks (for certain behaviors), while absolute-threshold atoms are supersets of
the blocks. As a by-product of our theoretical results, we provide a new theorem on k-cores
of large random graphs and also introduce a new technique for proving such theorems.
In addition to these theorems, we also explore several other aspects of our approach:
We explore definitions of ‘robust’ atomic structures. This considers conventions of be-
havior that work for a whole range of thresholds. This is important in many applications,
since there may be heterogeneity in a population’s behavioral thresholds, and there may
also be measurement error in the network. These definitions are then robust to removal or
addition of links or nodes, as well as variation in the thresholds that people are using. We
show how ‘robustness’ coarsens the atomic structure, both theoretically and in application
to high school friendship networks.
We also provide an algorithm for identifying the atomic structure of a network. As
the number of potential atomic structures grows exponentially in the number of nodes,
this is computationally demanding in some networks. Nonetheless, an algorithm that builds
conventions by expanding from small seed sets works in polynomial time and finds the atoms
in many cases. For instance, we show that it computes the correct atomic structure with a
probability going to one in a class of stochastic block models.
Our approach also suggests a method of recovering the behavioral threshold (preferences
of the agents) from the observation of a network and an associated behavioral norm. We
also show how one can distinguish whether behavior is driven by a fractional threshold or
an absolute threshold. We illustrate this by showing that smoking behaviors in a US high
school is better explained by a fractional than an absolute threshold.
Finally, our approach can also be useful in devising a new algorithm for optimally seeding
the diffusion of a new technology or behavior. By identifying the behavioral communities in
a network, one knows how many nodes need to be seeded and in which communities, and
can devise good approximation algorithms for optimal seeding, and ones that significantly
outperform random seedings.1
Although there is an enormous literature that examines how to partition the nodes of
a network into a collection of “communities” (see Fortunato (2010)), much of that litera-
ture is motivated entirely by the position of nodes in a graph.2 This traces back to Lorrain
1Random seedings can do well in simple contagion processes in which there is no threshold for behavioral
choices (Akbarpour, Malladi, and Saberi, 2017). However, if behavior involves a threshold, then our approach
significantly outperforms random seedings.
2There is a literature that builds models of homophily which result in communities, such as Currarini,
Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010); Chen, Liu, Sun, and Wang (2010); Currarini and Mengel (2012); Kets and
Sandroni (2016). That is a very different perspective, since it is preferences over partners that determines
the network, while here is it networks that are determining behavior.
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and White’s (1971) notion of structural equivalence among nodes in a network, which iden-
tified nodes that were interchangeable in terms of their positions. While their notion of
equivalence was an important first step in understanding the communities in a network, it
was so restrictive (nodes need to have identical sets of friends in a network) that only very
particular networks produce interesting equivalence relations. Their definition was loosened
and extended in various directions (e.g., see White and Reitz (1983); Borgatti and Everett
(1992)) including block models (Holland, Laskey, and Leinhardt (1983)), and ultimately to
the extensive community detection literature.
Our approach is not only different in terms of what we identify, but also in terms of
the basic perspective that drives our definition. We derive community structure from the
patterns of behavior that a network can support - so our approach is driven by what a
network does rather than, and only indirectly, by the structural patterns that it exhibits.
Of course which patterns of behaviors a network supports depends on its structure, but this
change in focus is fundamental and does a couple of things. First, it provides a reasoning
behind what a community is – a microfoundation. Second, it often leads us to find more
basic “atoms” – or different communities than standard community detection algorithms.
In particular, our community partitions are often refinements of those produced by other
algorithms because larger blocks identified by others tend to have subtle substructures along
which behaviors can diverge. Also, for some behaviors the atoms go across blocks as the
thresholds for contagion are low enough that blocks are not the right objects for identifying
behavior. Which community partition is correct depends, of course, on the application, but
the atoms that our approach identifies are important in attempting to influence or predict
behavior.
Obviously, our results relates to a games-on-networks analysis (e.g., see Jackson and
Zenou (2014)). A first contribution in that direction was Morris (2000),3 whose results
addressed a question of when it is that a network allows for two different actions to be played
in equilibrium. Our analysis provides new definitions, perspectives, and results concerning
the behavioral conventions that a network can sustain.
Our results also provides new insights into the estimation of preferences in settings with
complementarities (Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009)), as well as how to best seed a
network when there are complementarities in diffusion (e.g., see Granovetter (1978); Centola,
Egu´ıluz, and Macy (2007); Aral, Muchnik, and Sundararajan (2013)).
3There is an earlier literature on the majority game or voting game, e.g., Clifford and Sudbury (1973);
Holley and Liggett (1975) that is a precursor to Morris’s analysis for a specific threshold.
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2 A Model
2.1 networks
A finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of people or nodes, with generic indices i, j, are connected in a
network g.
A network is a simple graph, (N, g), consisting of a finite set of nodes or vertices N
together with a list of the undirected edges that are present g. We let ij ∈ g indicate that
the undirected link (or edge or tie) between nodes i and j is present in the graph.
We consider undirected networks (mutual friendships) and so g is taken to be symmetric.
We adopt the convention that ii /∈ g so that agents are not friends with themselves.
Agent i’s neighbors in g is the set Ni(g) ⊂ N \ {i} Ni(g) ≡ {j|ij ∈ g}.
Isolated nodes are not of much interest in our setting, so we ignore them. They are easily
incorporated by allowing them to each be their own convention. In what follows we presume
that a network is such that each node has at least one neighbor.
2.2 Conventions
A behavior is characterized a threshold q ∈ (0, 1), and agents adopt that behavior if at least
q of neighbors do.
One interpretation is that a person plays a coordination game with each one of his or her
neighbors:
Neighbor′s Choice :
Adopt Behavior Not Adopt
Own Choice : Adopt Behavior x y
Not Adopt w z
where x > w and z > y. The agent makes one choice but cares about how that behavior
matches in each of his or her interactions. This coordination game has a corresponding
threshold that if at least q neighbors adopt the behavior, then the agent’s best response is
to adopt too:
q =
z − y
x− w + z − y .
Exactly at this threshold an agent is indifferent, but otherwise has a unique best response.
Generically, the threshold would never be hit exactly. However, some rational thresholds,
such as 1/2, are prominent in the literature,4 and so we allow for rational thresholds.
Unless otherwise noted, we break ties so that an agent adopts the behavior if exactly
q neighbors do. Similar results are induced if one presumes that agents do not adopt the
behavior exactly at the threshold by then looking at a threshold of q − ε for some small
4The ‘voter game’ or ‘majority game’ is well-studied (e.g., see the discussion in Jackson and Zenou (2014)).
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ε < 1
n−1 . If one reverses the tie-breaking then our use of open and closed intervals below
reverses.
A convention associated with some threshold q on a network g is a group S ⊂ N , for
which all members of S have a fraction of at least q of their neighbors in S, and all agents
not in S have strictly less than q of their neighbors in S.
A couple of conventions are pictured in Figure 1 for a q of .4.
(a) The pink nodes form a convention (b) In this example, the complement is also a con-
vention for the same q
Figure 1: Conventions: A couple of conventions when q = .4.
Although the two conventions in Figure 1 are complementary sets, it is not always true
that a convention’s complement is also a convention. An example of a convention whose
complement is not a convention is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Conventions: A convention for q = .4 for which its complement is not a
convention.
Although the complement of a convention is not always a convention for the same q, it
is necessarily a convention for the complementary 1 − q (up to tie-breaking), as we note in
the following observation.
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Observation 1 Consider q such that q cannot be expressed as a fraction with di in the
denominator for any i ∈ N (e.g., if q irrational). Then S is a convention for q if and only
if N \ S is a convention for 1− q.
2.3 Cohesive Sets and Conventions
Following Morris (2000), we define a group S ⊂ N to be q-cohesive if each of its members
have a fraction at least q of their neighbors in the group.
A group S ⊂ N is q-closed if every individual outside of S (in N \ S) has a fraction of
his or her friends in the group that is less than q.
Observation 2 A group S forms a convention with a threshold q if and only if it is q-
cohesive and q-closed.
2.4 Absolute Thresholds
The above definitions are relative to some fraction of neighbors taking an action. This applies
naturally to coordination problems.
For some other games of strategic complements, it can be natural to adopt a behavior if
at least t neighbors do, for some t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
For instance, one might want to learn to play bridge if at least three other friends do.
Clearly, if the network is regular of degree d, then S is a convention for q in a relative
(fraction setting) if and only if S is a convention for t = qd in the absolute setting. However,
when one examines networks that are not regular, then there are q’s that generate conventions
that are not conventions for any t, (and vice versa).
Thus, the absolute thresholds are also of interest.
In what follows, there are equivalent definitions just switching q and t everywhere.
In the threshold setting, t = 1 generates the component structure as its atoms, while
t ≥ 2 subdivides the component structure.
2.5 Community Structures as Partitions Generated by Conven-
tions
We now define the central concept of the paper: how community structures are defined from
conventions.
Given a network g, let C(q, g) denote the σ-algebra generated by all conventions that are
robust relative to q.
The atoms of C(q, g) (minimal nonempty sets in C(q, g)) exist by finiteness. Note that
they form a partition that generates C(q, g).
Thus, the atoms of C(q, g) form a community structure.
We use the terms ‘communities’ and ‘atoms’ interchangeably in what follows to describe
the atoms of C(q, g).
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To see how conventions define communities, let us consider all of the other conventions
associated with the network from Figure 1:
Figure 3: More Conventions: The other (non-degenerate) conventions when q = .4 (which
are also conventions for q ∈ (1/3, 2/3]) .
The partition induced by all of these conventions is pictured in Figure 4.
Nodes inside an atom always behave the same as all other nodes in the same atom
in all conventions for q, and if they are in different atoms then there is some convention
under which behave differently. Thus, there is a behavioral sense in which these nodes are
tied together and define a community. These atoms are also subsets of any convention, and
conventions are necessarily unions of atoms, and thus the atoms are the basic building blocks
of coordinated behaviors in a society.
2.6 Dependence of Community Structure on the Threshold q
The set of conventions can vary with the threshold, q, as different q’s impose different
restrictions in terms of cohesiveness and closure.
In Figure 5, we display the atoms for the social network in an American high school
from The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) for a
few different choices of q.
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Figure 4: The Behavioral Communities: The behavioral communities for q = .4.
(a) q=1/4 (b) q=1/3
(c) q=1/2
Figure 5: : The atomic partitions in a network of friendships in a high school from the Add
Health data set for various q’s.
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It is important to note that community structures are not necessarily nested as q varies.
As q is increased the cohesiveness requirement for a convention gets harder to satisfy, while
the closure requirement gets easier to satisfy. Thus, there is no monotonicity of conventions
as q changes. This means community structures may change non-monotonically in q.
2.7 Community Structures from Robust Conventions
Given the dependence of the community structure on the specific level of q, it is useful to
define conventions that are ‘robust’ in the sense that they remain conventions for some set
of qs.
There are at least four reasons for considering communities that are generated by con-
ventions that are robust to some range of q’s:
• One may wish to identify robust communities that remain intact for a variety of be-
haviors.
• Individuals may be heterogeneous in their preferences and so behave according to a
range of qs at the same time.
• The network that is observed may have measurement error in it, so that there may
be missing links and/or nodes (or contain extras), and so one would like to have a
convention that is robust to changes in the fractions of neighbors that are undertaking
a given action.
• A network may evolve over time, and so the current network might only be an approx-
imation of what might be in place at some other time.
Considering conventions that work for a range of q’s addresses all of these issues.
We say that a convention is a robust convention relative to some set Q ⊂ [0, 1] if it is a
convention for all q ∈ Q.
As an illustration, the conventions in Figure 1 are both robust conventions for (1/3, 2/3],
but not for any additional q’s.
Given a network g, let C(Q, g) denote the σ-algebra generated by all conventions that
are robust relative to Q.
Robustness matters, as it is more stringent to require that a convention hold for a range
of q’s rather than just a single q. That leads to fewer conventions and a coarser convention
structure.
One reason that robustness can be very useful is easily seen in the following analysis
of the behavioral communities in our high school social network. Even a small amount of
robustness can have a large impact when dealing with rational q’s, as illustrated in Figure
6.
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(a) q = 1/3 (b) q = 1/3± ε
Figure 6: : Even a small amount of ‘robustness’ (ε < 1
n
) coarsens the atomic partition of
the high school social network at a threshold of 1/3.
3 Some Facts about Behavioral Communities
To begin to illustrate how behavioral conventions work, we first note some simple facts about
how community structures change as we change q and Q.
3.1 Varying q and Q
The following lemma collects some obvious but important observations that help characterize
robust community structures. A key observation is that only the extreme points of Q are
needed to check whether some convention is robust with respect to Q. This follows since
cohesivness is most demanding at the sup(Q), while closure is most demanding at the inf(Q),
and so requiring something be a convention for all of Q then has to work at the extremeties.
Lemma 1
• If Q contains inf(Q), then S is a robust convention with respect to Q if and only if it
is inf(Q)-closed and sup(Q)-cohesive.
• If inf(Q) /∈ Q then S is a robust convention with respect to Q if and only if it is
inf(Q) + ε-closed for all ε > 0 and sup(Q)-cohesive.
• If S is a robust convention relative to Q, then it is a convention for all q ∈ (inf(Q), sup(Q)].5
5If inf(Q) /∈ Q and inf(Q) is rational, then S may fail to be a convention at exactly inf(Q).
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• If S is a robust convention relative to Q and Q′ ⊂ Q, then S is a robust convention
for Q′.
• If Q′ ⊂ Q ⊂ [0, 1], then C(Q, g) is coarser than C(Q′, g) for any g.
Figure 7 illustrates how the atomic structure coarsens as we expand the robust-Q range.
(a) q = 1/2± 1/10 (b) q = 1/2± 1/5
Figure 7: : How the robust atomic structure for the high school social network coarsens as
Q is widened.
We can also compare how the communities change as we vary the q at which our robust
community structures are centered, as seen in Figure 8. With these non nested changes in
Q, the atomic structures are no longer nested.
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(a) q = 1/4± ε (b) q = 1/3± ε
(c) q = 1/2± ε
Figure 8: : The atomic partitions for the high school social network for various q’s plus or
minus ε.
3.2 Conventions for q and 1− q
The conventions for q and 1− q coincide (provided these are irrational). The following is a
corollary to Observation 1.
Observation 3 If q is irrational (or such that no agent could ever be indifferent so are
rational but with a denominator different from all multiples of agents’ degrees), then C(q, g) =
C(1− q, g).
This observation is useful as it means that when we are interested in conventions that
are robust to a set of thresholds that lies to one side of q = 1/2, then understanding what
12
happens for small conventions implies that we know the conventions for the case of large
conventions.
Interestingly, however, even though the behavioral communities in Figure 4 are the same
for Q = (1/3, 1/2] and Q = (1/2, 2/3], those are not the behavioral communities for Q =
(1/3, 2/3]. That is because, the conventions for Q = (1/3, 1/2] and Q = (1/2, 2/3] are
complements of each other, but only some are robust conventions for all of Q = (1/3, 2/3]:
essentially only the conventions for which both it and its complement are conventions for
both of the sub intervals. This is pictured in the Figures 9 and 10.
Figure 9: Robust Conventions: The only conventions that are robust when Q′′ =
(1/3, 2/3].
A robust convention for Q = (q, 1 − q] for some q < 1/2 is necessarily such that its
complement is also a robust convention for Q.
3.3 Tight Sets and Atoms are Distinct
Is there an easy way to characterize atoms? There are many subtleties.
A first observation is that conventions can have subsets that still form a convention.
Thus, one way to find atoms might be to look at minimal conventions. So, let us define
minimal conventions.
We say that a group S ⊂ N is called q-tight if it is q-cohesive and q-closed, and has no
nonempty strict subsets that are q-cohesive and q-closed.
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Figure 10: Robust Behavioral Communities: The behavioral communities for for Q′′ =
(1/3, 2/3]. Note the contrast with Figure 4.
A group S forms a convention with a threshold q and has no strict subsets that form a
convention if and only if it is q-tight. It is then called a tight convention.
Figure 11: Tight Conventions: The tight conventions when q = .4.
It seems logical to conjecture that q-tight groups (at least when q > 1/2) would form
atoms. The example pictured in Figures 12 and 13 shows the first subtlety: atoms can not
only divide, but can actually subdivide q-tight groups.
The example from Figures 12 and 13 shows a related second subtlety: there are networks
for which no atom is a convention.
A third subtlety is that not only is it possible for tight groups not to be contained in any
atom, but it is also possible to have completely disconnected nodes form an atom.
For instance, pairs of nodes that are structurally equivalent (have the same friends) are
14
(a) A convention. (b) A convention with the clique
of four nodes in the center.
(c) A convention involving the
upper left half of the nodes.
Figure 12: Splitting a tight group: Even though the central four nodes form a clique
and are q = .6-tight as a group, they can be split apart in some conventions.
Figure 13: The partition into communities when q = .6. Even though the middle group
forms a clique and is q = .6 tight, it is not an atom and its members are split apart in the
community partition.
in the same atom regardless of whether they are friends with each other. In fact, one can go
even further: there are atoms in which none of the nodes in the atom have any neighbors
in common. The example in Figures 14 and 15 shows such a situation, in which there are a
number of nodes that are similar to each other in terms of positions in the network and so
end up in the same atom, but none of the nodes in the atom even have a friend in common.6
Of course, there are some obvious properties that atoms have. For instance, they must be
finer than components, so there is some limitation on how disconnected atoms can be. This
6Thus, they are not structurally equivalent in the sense of Lorrain and White (1971) - these nodes satisfy
a weaker form of similarity in position.
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(a) All nodes infected. (b) One atom infected (c) The other atom infected.
Figure 14: An atom that is never a convention: The three nonempty conventions when
q = 3/4.
Figure 15: The partition into communities when q = 3/4. Note that there are three atoms,
but the middle atom is never a convention on its own. In fact, none of the nodes in the atom
are even connected to each other, nor do they even have any neighbors in common. However,
those four nodes are structurally similar to each other in terms of having similar sorts of
connections to the other atoms, which means that they always end up acting in exactly the
same way.
observation follows since if two nodes are not path connected, then their different components
are each a convention. Thus, they sometimes behave differently, and so are not in the same
atom.
There are more things that we can deduce about atoms.
We say that a set S is q-isolated if it does not intersect any different q-tight group.
The following lemma provides one fact about atoms.
Lemma 2 If a set S is q-tight and q-isolated, then it forms an atom relative to q.
Lemma 2 is a corollary to an even more straightforward lemma (whose proof is thus
omitted).
Let us say that two nodes are structurally similar (relative to q) if whenever one is in
some q-cohesive and q-closed group then so is the other.
Lemma 3 The sets of structurally similar nodes form equivalence classes which are the
atoms.
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Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 3 since all of the nodes in a tight and isolated set are
necessarily structurally similar, and cannot be structurally similar to any node outside of
that set.
Let an atom be called internal relative to q if there exists a convention which coincides
with the atom. In Figures 14 and 15, the two atoms on the left and the right are internal
atoms.
The internal atoms are ‘intuitive’ ones that are minimal conventions. The idea is that
the play of people in that atom have to be the same because of the contagion of behavior
within the atom.
Note that the internal atoms are exactly the q-tight and isolated sets of nodes. Thus,
one class of atoms has an intuitive characterization.
The remaining atoms are external ones. In Figures 14 and 15, the middle atom is an
external atom. It is an atom whose structure is determined by structural similarity and
positions relative to other nodes that are sufficiently similar that the nodes have to play the
same way.
It is not simply that nodes that can be mapped onto each other in some permutation
must be in the same atom, as we see in the next example. There is complete symmetry in
the network and yet no two nodes are in the same atom.
The example in Figures 16 and 17 is an interesting one since it has features different
from either of the previous examples. There is a full symmetry to the network and lots of
equivalences between nodes, and many tight groups, and yet the partition is into atoms of
singletons. This is the last subtlety that we point out.
(a) A convention. (b) A convention excluding one
triple.
(c) A convention excluding a dif-
ferent triple.
Figure 16: : The conventions when q = 3/4 are either the whole network, or that excluding
some triple that form a triangle .
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Figure 17: The partition into communities when q = 3/4. Even though the conventions
are generally large subgroups of the community, and the network has strong symmetry
properties, all atoms are singletons.
4 Community Structures in some Random Network
Models
As we see above, atoms can be quite interesting sets. Beyond the intuitive interior atoms,
there are exterior atoms that are dependent upon the graph structure in complex ways,
which makes an abstract characterization difficult. Nonetheless, there is a lot that we can
deduce about them in random graphs.
To get more of a feeling of how atoms behave, we prove some results about how they act
in a basic and well-known class of random networks that exhibit natural divides between
nodes: a stochastic block model. Such a model has different ‘types’ of nodes (the blocks)
and allows for tunable levels of homophily in the network for various combinations of types
of nodes. These models are natural ones for modeling and analyzing homophily, for instance
(e.g., see Golub and Jackson (2012)).
We show that under ‘natural’ choices of q, the atoms are subsets of the blocks, while for
any fixed t, the atoms coalesce to coincide with the whole network. This shows that the
blocks capture natural divisions in behavior and norms when behavior depends on relative
ratios of friends taking behavior; but if there is only some minimal threshold needed then
behavior necessarily spreads across blocks.
4.1 A Stochastic Block Model
Let n index a sequence of random graph models, tracking the number of nodes in the
society.
The society is partitioned in different types of people or nodes indexed by J(n) , with
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generic indices of types j, j′, and cardinalities j(n). These might refer to demographic
characteristics like age, religion, gender, ethnicity, profession, etc. So a particular type
might be female Hispanic lawyers.
Let Π(n) denote the associated partition of the nodes by types.
The probability that any node of type j ∈ J(n) is linked to a node of type j′ ∈ J is given
by some pjj′(n) = pj′j(n). Links are independent across all pairs of nodes.
Let djj(n) = pjj(n)(j(n)− 1) and djj′(n) = pjj′j′(n) denote the expected links of a type
j ∈ J(n) to types j and j′, respectively, in society n, and dj(n) =
∑
j′∈J(n) djj′(n) be the
overall expected degree of a type j node.
Let gn denote a random network generated on the n nodes.
4.2 Behavioral Communities in Stochastic Block Models
4.2.1 Fraction-based Threshold Communities
We first show that q-based – ‘fractional’ – communities are subsets of the blocks in a block
model when the blocks are sufficiently well-separated, in a sense which we make precise
below.
Theorem 1 Consider a growing sequence of stochastic block networks for which there exists
f(n)→∞ such that djj′(n) > f(n) log(n) for all jj′, and for which there there exists some
q > q > 0 such that:
• djj(n)/dj(n) > q for each j ∈ J(n), and
• djj′(n)/dj(n) < q for each j′ 6= j.
Then, for any compact Q, Q ⊂ (q, q) or Q ⊂ (1 − q, 1 − q), the partitions corresponding to
C(Q, gn) are weakly finer than Π(n) with a probability going to 1 as n grows.
Thus, behavior-based communities related to behaviors that depend on the fraction of
one’s neighbors adopting a behavior are a subset of the blocks.
Theorem 1 implies that if there is homophily in a network, so that there are some charac-
teristics that drive differences in linking probabilities, then the behavioral atoms will uncover
that homophily and possibly more.
In particular, it is worth noting that Theorem 1 admits the possibility that behavioral
atoms will sometimes be finer than the breaks in the graph associated with differences in
underlying linking frequencies. Those are often the communities found via the popular
modular methods (e.g., the Louvain method of Blondel et al. (2008)), and so our atoms will
sometimes be finer than those blocks/modules. In the case of block models, many modular
methods will pick up the blocks and not subsets of those blocks (e.g., see Copic et al. (2009)).
Those methods maximize some measure of the density of links within a community to those
going out of a community. The reason that behavioral communities will sometimes be finer is
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that the cohesiveness condition is a node-by-node condition and not a total weight condition,
and similarly, closure is a requirement that no node have more than a certain connectivity
with a set, not an average condition. Thus, there can be fractures within a block that allow
for a convention to divide that block.
This is an important distinction – even in cases where the graph is generated with well-
defined blocks, it can end up with additional purely randomly generated and subtle structure
that actually splits nodes apart in terms of their behaviors. The fineness of the behavioral
atoms is picking up additional divisions in the network that have real consequences but are
not captured in the basic blocks.
It is important to emphasize that the additional fineness of behavioral atoms capture
true divides in the realized network that allow conventions to split blocks. The additional
fineness is capturing real behavioral divides that go beyond the block structure and thus are
not defects in terms of defining atoms but real information that behavioral atoms convey
that other methods do not. 7
A Comparison of Behavioral Communities and Modularity-Based Community
Detection Algorithms
We demonstrate that behavioral atoms can subdivide communities defined by standard
community detection algorithms, such as modular methods that work off of relative link
densities. We use the high school social network from Figure 7.
Figure 18 depicts the communities identified by a modularity-minimizing algorithm (specif-
ically, the Louvain method for community detection, Blondel et al. (2008)) via the dotted
outlines (and color in subfigure (a)), while the colors in the other subfigures represent the
behavioral atoms.
7Another distinction is that behavioral communities change with the threshold and Q, while modular
methods are just looking for higher internal than external density, rather than requiring specific conditions
on those densities.
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(a) The communities found via modularity
minimization
(b) The q = 1/2 behavioral atoms (color)
compared with the modular communitities
(outline)
(c) The Q = 1/2± ε robust behavioral atoms
(color) compared with the modular commu-
nities (outline)
Figure 18: : Comparing the behavioral atoms to the communities found via the Louvain
method of modularity minimization (Blondel et al., 2008).
In Figure 18 we see that the q = 1/2 atoms fracture the modules quite a bit, but
partly because of the exact nature of the fraction 1/2 with can leave some nodes exactly
at indifference in some situations. If we examine a robust version (plus or minus ε < 1/n),
then we get a clearer picture. The behavioral atoms at this Q = 1/2± ε level are subsets of
the modules and in two cases split the modules/blocks into parts. This means that within
those blocks it would be possible to have a robust convention that cuts across those blocks
and has part of the block acting differently from the other part.
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This effect becomes even starker when we look at q = .45, as in Figure 19 Here we get
a more dramatic fragmentation of the modules. We also see that increasing the range of
robustness makes a difference, and if the range of Q is increased enough then our atoms
coincide with the modules, except for one module/block that can still support multiple
subdividing robust conventions.
(a) The Q = 0.45 ± ε behavioral atoms
(color) compared with the modular commu-
nitites (outline)
(b) The Q = 0.45 ± 1/10 robust behavioral
atoms (color) compared with the modular
communities (outline)
Figure 19: : Comparing the behavioral atoms to the communities found via modularity
minimization.
Interestingly, when we lower the q, as in Figure 20, then we see that the atoms actually
go across modules/blocks. This happens for values of q that are lower than the frequency of
some cross-block links. For behaviors with low thresholds, contagion will occur across blocks
and so it is impossible to have atoms that are restricted to some blocks. For this network, a
behavior that has a q = 1/4 threshold cannot be contained by any blocks – and the atomic
structure reflects that.
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(a) The q = 1/3± ε behavioral atoms (color)
compared with the modular communitites
(outline)
(b) The Q = 1/4±ε robust behavioral atoms
(color) compared with the modular commu-
nities (outline)
Figure 20: : Comparing the behavioral atoms for lower q to the communities found via
modularity minimization. With low q, communities necessarily connect across blocks. It is
only when q is above the cross-block density that atoms fall within blocks.
The difference between, for instance, a modular method and the behavioral method is
that a modular method only works off of average density. Instead, individual link patterns
determine behavior rather than averages. If one pays attention to individual patterns then
finer fissures appear that are not captured by standard algorithms that operate on aggregate
statistics, and the possibility of contagion across blocks emerges.
Coincidence of Atoms and Blocks in Strongly-Distinguished Block Models There
are some conditions under which the atoms coincide with the blocks. The blocks have to
be sufficiently distinguished so that contagion does not occur across blocks, and have a high
enough density so that they coalesce and have no internal fissures. Under those conditions,
for an appropriate Q, the atoms will coincide with the blocks, as captured in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider a growing sequence of stochastic block networks satisfying the con-
ditions of Theorem 1 and for which 3q > 1 + q + 2ε + j(n)
dj(n)
for some ε > 0. The partition
corresponding to C([q + ε, q − ε], gn) coincides with Π(n) with a probability going to 1 as n
grows.
The sufficient condition that 3q > 1 + q + 2ε + j(n)
dj(n)
for each j – a ‘sparse-dense block
model’ – requires a high level of connectedness within blocks, and is a sufficient condition.
The blocks become robust conventions themselves and all robust conventions are supersets
23
of the blocks. Thus, with a probability going to 1 in n, observing as few as #J(n) different
robust conventions allows one to recover Π(n).
The condition on the density within blocks prevents blocks from fragmenting under a
behavior has a threshold of no more than q− ε. Having the behavior’s threshold be at least
q+ε ensures that the behavior does not leak across blocks and a convention can be sustained
within a block.
The conclusions in Theorem 1 contrast with the atomic structure associated with behav-
iors derived from some absolute threshold t. There, as n increases, even with a relatively
slowly growing and sparse density, behavior is contagious within and across blocks, so that
the whole network becomes the only convention, as we show next.
4.2.2 Absolute Thresholds
Behaviors based on absolute thresholds generally have contagion across blocks – provided
that blocks have some minimal numbers of interconnections (just above the sharp threshold
for inter-connectedness at a rate t).
Theorem 2 Consider some finite t > 0 and a growing sequence of stochastic block networks.
If there exists ε > 0 for which pjj′(n) > (1+ε)
(
t log(n)
n
)1/t
for each j′, j, then with a probability
going to 1 as n grows the partition corresponding to C(t, gn) is the degenerate one generated
by the atom of N .
Clearly, if pjj′ falls substantially below the threshold for enough jj
′ pairs then the graph
will fragment. Provided the probabilities internal to blocks is large enough to generate
conventions within the blocks, then the community structure will be non-degenerate.
We prove Theorem 2 by proving the following theorem about random graphs, which is
of independent interest.
We could not find Theorem 3 in the graph-theory literature, so we have proven it directly.
It’s proof methodology also appears to be new and may also be of independent interest.
4.3 k-cores of Random Graphs
Following standard definitions, a k-core of an undirected graph g is a maximal subgraph,
including fewer than n nodes, such that all nodes in the subgraph have degree of at least k
within the subgraph.
Note that when a nonempty k-core exists, then it must be that the k-core forms a
convention for threshold t = k.
We define a weak k-core to be a nonempty subgraph, including fewer than n nodes, for
which all nodes in the subgraph have degree at least k within the subgraph and for which
no single node could be added and have degree at least k.
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Note that the set of weak k-cores are exactly the set of conventions (other than the whole
set N) for threshold t = k.
A k-closed set is a nonempty subgraph, which has at least k nodes and fewer than n
nodes, for which all nodes outside of the subgraph have fewer than k connections to the
nodes in the subgraph.
Note that every (weak) k-core is k-closed, but the converse is not true as being k-closed
does not require that nodes in the subgraph have degree at least k.
We use the standard notation G(n, p) to indicate an Erdos-Renyi random graph on n
nodes with a i.i.d. probability p(n) of any link existing.
Theorem 3 Consider a growing sequence of Erdos-Renyi random graphs G(n, p).
• If p(n) > (1 + ε)
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
for any ε > 0, then the probability that a k-closed set
exists goes to 0 (and thus so does the probability that there exist any weak k-cores or
k-cores, or (tight) conventions that have k = t and involve less than all nodes).
• Conversely, if p(n) < (1 − ε)
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
for any ε > 0, then the probability that a
k-closed set exists goes to one.(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
is what is known as a sharp threshold in random graph theory.
When k = 1 it reduces to the threshold for connection in an Erdos-Renyi random graph.
Note that even though Theorem 3 is about Erdos-Renyi random graphs, and Theorem
2 is about stochastic block models, stochastic block models can be constructed by starting
from an Erdos-Renyi random graph, and than adding additional links within blocks (and
possibly across some pairs of blocks). Thus, Theorem 2 is a corollary.
Once p(n) < (1− ε)
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
the number of k closed sets of sized k, as well as k+ 1...,
goes to infinity. In that case, the existence of a (weak) k-core just requires that the probability
is large enough so that out of that infinite sequence of such sets at least one forms a clique.
Thus, as long as the link probability does not drop so low that such cliques disappear, there
will exist a (weak) k-core.
The proof technique that we use is based on showing that the probability of having a
k closed set of k nodes at the threshold of
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
can be bounded by the probability
that there exists an isolated node at the threshold of log(n)
n
. This is useful given that the
behavior of this other event is well-known, while the first event is not and involves more
intricate correlations. These bounds turn out to be tight and so are useful in proving this
theorem. We have not seen this technique, of bounding the probability of one class of events
in one random graph model by bounding it by the probability of a different class of events
in a different random graph model, used before.
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5 Additional Empirical Examples
Here we show the atomic structures for some other network data sets, and compare those
partitions to partitions of the network based on node demographics.
5.1 Indian Villages
Figure 21 pictures the network of social and financial relationships in an Indian village (data
taken from Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013)). The shape of each node
represents its caste, and the number in the node designates its subcaste.
Figure 21: Network of Social Relationships in an Indian Village
Figure 22 pictures some q atomic partitions for this social network.
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(a) q=1/4 (b) q=1/3
(c) q=1/2
Figure 22: : The atomic partitions for an Indian village for various q’s.
When we expand from the single q’s to small robust intervals about these points, the
partitions coarsen noticeably, as pictured in Figure 23.
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(a) q = 1/4± ε (b) q = 1/3± ε
(c) q = 1/2± ε
Figure 23: : The atomic partitions for an Indian village as we expand about the single q
points above.
Observe that the 1/2±ε division picks up the subcaste division in the triangle caste: the
triangles in subcaste 35 are in the same behavioral atom as the majority hexagon caste (the
red atom), while most of the triangles in subcaste 1 are in their own separate behavioral
atom (in purple). This suggests that behavioral atoms can pick up subtle social divisions.
In this particular network, expanding the Q ranges by any more than 1/20 forces the
entire main component to coalesce into a single atom.
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6 Finding the Atoms
In this section, we describe a polynomial-time approximation algorithm that nevertheless
recovers the atomic decomposition with high probability for some types of random graphs.
We describe the algorithm for the q (fractional threshold) setting, but the logic for the t
(absolute threshold) setting is the same.
Finding the decomposition of a network into its behavioral atoms by exhaustively check-
ing whether each subset of nodes forms a convention is computationally infeasible, even for
moderately sized networks, as the number of subsets is exponential in the number of nodes.
Indeed, finding atomic decompositions appears to be np-hard problem. Nonetheless, an al-
gorithm works well in many settings in which the network has a robust atomic structure to
it.
The algorithm starts by forming the collection of connected subsets of nodes of size less
than some fixed k. The number of such subsets is at most
(
n
k
)
, and we will show later that
k can be fixed independent of n, so that the number of subsets formed is polynomial in n.
The algorithm then selects a subset and generates its minimal Q-closed superset. If that
superset also happens to be Q-cohesive, then it is a convention, and the algorithm stores the
convention and moves on to the next subset in the working collection. If not, the algorithm
adds to the superset the node whose addition most increases the node-wise minimum level of
cohesion in the resulting subset, and then reiterates the preceding procedure with this new
subset in place of the original subset. Since each such iteration adds at least one node to
the subset, the algorithm terminates in at most
(
n
k
)× n steps.
Under the conditions of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, when the atoms turn out to be the
blocks (which in that case happens with a probability converging to 1), then the algorithm
will identify those blocks as atoms. Picking a k-node subset of a block will necessarily result
in the block being found as a convention by the way the algorithm is designed, and so the
blocks will be identified (with a probability going to 1).
7 Optimal Seeding
The behavioral atoms tell us how coordination behaviors can be distributed across a social
network. It is thus natural that the atomic partition also provides useful information for ef-
forts to influence those behaviors. In this section we explore the how knowledge of behavioral
atoms helps in seeding diffusion.
Given a social network g, a behavioral threshold q, and an initial budget of k nodes to
be chosen as “seeds,” the optimal seeding problem is to find a set of k initial adopters which
leads to the largest number of nodes in g eventually adopting the behavior, assuming that all
nodes other than the initial adopters sequentially best respond to their neighbors’ adoption
decisions.
A solution to this problem is challenging because the fully optimal seeding depends
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on details of the network structure: even adding or removing a single link can change the
optimal set of nodes completely. While we cannot offer a fully optimal solution to the seeding
problem, which is a variation on ones that are known to be NP-hard (Kempe, Kleinberg, and
Tardos (2003, 2005)), we can show that the behavioral atoms inform an intuitive heuristic
for the seeding problem that offers significant improvements over random seeding.
This contrasts with straight contagion settings (t = 1), where random seedings can do
quite well (e.g., Mønsted et al. (2017)). Here, the seeding problem is complicated by the fact
that behavior depends on several neighbors taking an action rather than just one. Thus,
placing several seeds close together is necessary to get this sort of contagion process started,
while dispersing them randomly is better in a simple contagion process.
In a network with distinct behavioral communities, the seeding problem is even more
complex since spreading may not cross boundaries, as our analysis above shows. Thus, our
behavioral atoms provide a natural boundary for this problem: we have to seed enough
nodes in an atom to get the atom to adopt, and at the same time we have to hit enough
distinct atoms to spread the behavior. This motivates the following “greedy” atom-wise
seeding heuristic:
1. Find the q-atoms of G. Order them A1, A2, ...Am.
2. For each atom Ai, find the minimal number of seeds needed to turn the entire atom
on. Call this the cost of the atom, ci.
3. Greedily seed the atoms in decreasing order of the size-to-cost ratio |Ai|/ci until we
have used all k seeds (skipping over any atoms that have seeding cost in excess of k)
or there are not atoms left that can be seeded with the remaining number of seeds.
4. If there are seeds left over, select seeds uniformly at random from the set of nodes
which are not in the q-closure of the set of seeds already selected.
(Note that step 2 can be accomplished by brute force computation if none of the atoms
is too large.) For moderately sized-networks, we can compute the optimal seeding by brute-
force to check how close this heuristic comes to the optimum spread. We can also compare
the heuristic’s results to those attained by random seeding. The table below shows this
comparison for randomly generated networks obtained by starting with an Erdos-Renyi graph
and then randomly closing triangles to obtain a target clustering coefficient of 0.2. Behavior
spreads by iterative best response with q = 1/2.
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n Linking Probability k Heuristic Average Share of Optimum Random Seeding Average Share of Optimum
20 0.1 5 0.73 0.50
20 0.3 5 0.81 0.47
20 0.5 5 0.86 0.41
40 0.1 8 0.86 0.42
40 0.25 8 0.80 0.35
40 0.3 8 0.82 0.30
40 0.1 15 0.75 0.60
40 0.25 15 0.78 0.52
40 0.3 15 0.78 0.44
We see that the greedy heuristic tends to achieve around 80 percent of the optimal
spread, while random seeding only manages about 50 percent. These results suggest that
the behavioral atoms do in fact provide useful information for the seeding process.
We also perform similar simulations in the stochastic block model, and obtain similar
results:
Num Blocks Block Size Density within Blocks Density Across Blocks k Heuristic Average Share of Optimum Random Seeding Average Share
2 20 0.2 0.1 5 0.77 0.49
2 20 0.5 0.1 5 0.73 0.38
2 20 0.2 0.1 8 0.81 0.62
2 20 0.5 0.1 8 0.79 0.51
2 30 0.2 0.1 5 0.72 0.44
2 30 0.5 0.1 5 0.68 0.59
2 30 0.2 0.1 8 0.77 0.54
2 30 0.5 0.1 8 0.82 0.59
3 20 0.2 0.1 5 0.72 0.42
3 20 0.5 0.1 5 0.76 0.38
3 20 0.2 0.1 8 0.81 0.49
3 20 0.5 0.1 8 0.78 0.56
3 30 0.2 0.1 5 0.68 0.37
3 30 0.5 0.1 5 0.7 0.32
3 30 0.2 0.1 8 0.81 0.44
3 30 0.5 0.1 8 0.84 0.5
We also examine how the comparison between random and heuristic seeding varies with
q. For very low values of q the two are quite similar, as concentrating seeds makes little
difference and behavior spreads widely. When q is very high even the optimal seeding with a
few seeds does not do well, and so either method does similarly. The divergence between the
methods appears in the middle ranges of q, where cohesiveness is important for spreading a
behavior and concentrating seeds within an atom becomes important. We see this in Figure
24. Figure 24 below plots the average share of the maximum possible spread attained by
our heuristic and by random seeding as we vary q for Erdos-Renyi networks with 35 nodes
and density 1/10. We see that the middle range q values are also exactly where our heuristic
gives the largest improvement over random seeding.
8 Estimating Behavioral Thresholds
To close, we discuss how to infer the behavior threshold q (or t) from observation of a network
and agents’ decisions to adopt a behavior.
Many applications are such that we not only observe a network, but we also observe
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(a) 3 Seeds (b) 4 Seeds
Figure 24: Comparing the average share of optimal spread attained by our heuristic vs.
random seeding as we vary q in Erdos-Renyi networks on 35 nodes with density 1/10.
which agents have chosen some given behavior. For instance, we have seen the adoption of a
new technology, or who cheats on their taxes, or who smokes (as in our illustration below),
etc.
From these data we can recover the q that is most likely to have generated that behavior
(or similarly, t) under the assumptions of the model.
As is well-known (e.g., see Aral et al. (2009); Bramoulle´ et al. (2009); Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens (2013b); Jackson et al. (2017)), homophily can confound behavior, and so work-
ing from an empirically observed convention might confound a behavior upon which atoms
are defined.
This does not impact any of the definitions up to this point in the paper, since the objec-
tive of our atomic analysis was to define atoms and communities based on what behaviors
can be supported in settings with strategic complements. Instead, if one is trying to esti-
mate a q from observed behavior, then what is driving behavior matters. In the appendix we
discuss methods of distinguishing behavior from homophily. In Subsections 8.1 and 8.2, for
the purposes of illustrating potential techniques, we presume that the conventions represent
peer-influenced behavior, and defer fuller discussion of including homophily in the appendix.
These techniques could augment experiments (e.g., Centola (2011)) or suitable instruments
(e.g., Aral and Nicolaides (2017)), to estimate preferences causally.
8.1 Estimating q
First, let us consider a case in which agents all have the same preferences and thus the same
threshold q for adopting a behavior.
We observe a network and a convention and wish to estimate a q.
Let Non = {i | i adopts} be the set of adopting nodes and Noff be its complement.
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For each agent i, let si be the share of i’s neighbors who adopt the behavior. Let
Son = {si|i adopts} be the distribution of realized on-neighbor shares for the players adopting
the behavior, and let Soff be the analog for the players not adopting.
There will be perfect separation of the distributions, with q satisfying:
maxSoff < q ≤ minSon
To illustrate, the network depicted below is an Erdos-Renyi network with 200 nodes and
the nodes are labeled as pink if they have adopted with a threshold of q = 2/5:
Figure 25: A randomly generated convention on an Erdos-Renyi Network
This equilibrium generates the distributions Son and Soff shown below. Observe that
q = 2/5 perfectly separates the distributions.
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Figure 26: Distributions of on-neighbor shares for nodes adopting (pink) and not adopt-
ing(blue)
Of course, in most empirical applications, there is likely to be some heterogeneity in pref-
erences and noisy behavior, so that the observed set of adopters may not form a convention
for any precise q.
We can adapt the model to account this in a number of different ways.
The simplest is to introduce a probability α > 0 with which each agent chooses his or her
adoption decision independently (with equal probability of adopting or not),8 ignoring other
agents. Those agents not making their decisions independently then play the coordination
game, with a threshold q, including best responding to their neighbors who made their
decisions independently.
The network below shows an outcome of this process on the network from figure 25 with
α = 1/5 and q = 2/5:
8One can also introduce a parameter for the probability of adopting independently, or a distribution of
such parameters and make that part of the estimation procedure. It could be identified as those who are not
matching neighbors are choosing independently. Here we stick with the simple case for illustration.
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Figure 27: Adoption Decisions when some nodes independently choose their adoption.
This outcome generates the distributions Son and Soff shown below. Because of the
independent adopters, we cannot perfectly separate the two distributions. However, the true
behavioral threshold q = 2/5 still approximately separates the distributions, in that most of
Soff lies below q and most of Son lies above it.
Figure 28: Distributions of ‘on’-neighbor shares for nodes adopting in pink and those not
adopting in blue.
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There are many ways to estimate q for this setting. A very simple and direct way
is to minimize the number of nodes that must be acting independently. This effectively
corresponds to the maximum likelihood estimator (for α values that are not too high).
In particular, consider a statistic that for each q counts how many nodes must be acting
independently (i.e., are not acting in accordance with q):
T (q) = |Non ∩ {i : si < q}|+ |Noff ∩ {I : si ≥ q}|.
Choosing a q̂ that is a minimizer of T (q).
Though we have only discussed estimation in the relative threshold q case, the approach
above extends directly to the absolute threshold (t) case by substituting the number of i’s
friends taking the action rather than the share (replace si with si×di) and then substituting
t for q:
T (t) = |Non ∩ {i : si × di < t}|+ |Noff ∩ {I : si × di ≥ t}|.
8.1.1 An Illustration of Estimating q
We illustrate the above technique by applying it to a famous example from the community
detection literature: Zachary’s Karate club.
This club spit into two pieces, with some of its members breaking off to form a new club.
The split is pictured in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Zachary’s Karate Club: the pink nodes are those who split off from the club
while the blue nodes stayed.
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We can consider the coordination game in which people prefer to split off if and only if at
least a share q of their friends do. We can then estimate q using our technique from above.
This is pictured in Figure 30.
Figure 30: The distribution of neighbors who split off from the club: Those who split off
had most of their friends also split, while those who stayed had fewer friends who split off.
To estimate q, we calculate the value of our “mistakes” statistic T at various potential
thresholds:
Figure 31: The fraction of nodes that would have to be deviating from coordination if the
true threshold were q for various values of q.
We see that T is minimized for q between 0.4 and 0.45. The set of q that minimize T
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will always be an interval, since “on”-neighbor shares must vary by discrete multiples of the
inverse of the least common product of the nodes’ degrees; but the size of the interval will
shrink as n grows. This interval serves as an estimate.
8.2 Testing Relative vs Absolute Thresholds
In this subsection, we use the statistic T (·) defined above to evaluate whether a relative, q,
or absolute, t, threshold model better fits the observed adoption decisions.9
If every person has the same degree, then the two models are interchangeable – every q
has an equivalent t. However, in any network in which degree varies across people, then the
two models diverge. In the relative model a higher degree person would require more friends
taking the action than a lower degree person in order to also want to take the action. In
the absolute threshold model, the number of friends needed to induce a person to take the
action is independent of the degree. This is the key to identifying which model better fits
the data.
To illustrate how the two models lead to different predictions and can be distinguished,
we apply the procedure to data on smoking decisions on a high school social network from
the AddHealth data.
Figure 32 pictures smoking in a high school social network: pink nodes represent students
who said that they had smoked a cigarette in the past twelve months, while blue nodes
represents student who had not.
9Previous work on testing for different models of peer influence have looked at whether it is information
or influence (e.g., Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013)) or whether it is a simple or complex
contagion (e.g., t = 1 versus t > 1 Centola (2011); Mønsted et al. (2017)). Here we are testing different types
of influence against each other.
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Figure 32: Smoking Adoption in a high school social network
We can compare how well the best-fitting absolute and relative thresholds divide the
distributions of on-neighbor shares and numbers, respectively.
(a) Best relative threshold split (b) Best absolute threshold split
Figure 33: : A comparison of how well a relative vs. an absolute threshold splits the
on-neighbor distributions
We estimate a relative threshold qˆ = 0.55, which gives a value of T (qˆ)/n = 0.36; and an
absolute threshold of tˆ = 2, which gives a test-statistic value of Tˆ (tˆ)/n = 0.4.
In this network there are n = 1221 students. The relative threshold qˆ = 0.55 results in
438 students who are not acting according to the predicted action based on the best fitting
threshold, while the absolute threshold tˆ = 2 has 486 students who are not acting according
to the predicted action based on the best fitting threshold - or an extra 48 students, which is
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four percent of the population. The relative threshold model thus better predicts behaviors
than the absolute threshold.
Distinguishing the two models statistically can be thought of as follows. Letting z be
the number of students who are not acting in accordance with the threshold, the chance of
matching the observed behaviors is10(
1− α
2
)n−z (α
2
)z
=
(
2− α
2
)n(
α
2− α
)z
.
This probability decreases exponentially in the number of errors z. Thus, the likelihood
is exponentially higher, by a factor
(
2−α
α
)z−z′
when the number of errors is z′ < z. When
z − z′ = 48, then even for α that is very high, the likelihood is much higher under q than t.
Then a log likelihood ratio test leads to a p-value of effectively zero.
If one did not use either model, then the best one could do would be to predict everyone
to be a smoker. That would lead to an error rate of 0.49 (the fraction of non-smokers) or
600 students. That is 162 worse than the relative threshold and 114 worse than the absolute
model. Again, a log likelihood ratio test leads to a p-value of effectively zero.
The fact that these strict q and t models are still mis-predicting more than a third of
the students’ actions is partly due to the fact that we are only using the network to predict
actions and not including information from demographics. In a data set where one includes
demographics, and allows the threshold to depend on demographics (e.g., race, income,
gender, etc.), then one could further increase the predictiveness of the model as behavioral
thresholds will adjust with demographics in many applications.
The technique we have outlined extends directly to allow for demographics. If X is the
demographic information, then one can fit a function q(X) to predict peoples thresholds and
behaviors and then use
T (q(·)) = |Non ∩ {i : si < q(Xi)}|+ |Noff ∩ {I : si ≥ q(Xi)}|,
as the objective and select q(·) to minimize the function (and similarly for an absolute
threshold function t(·)).
To illustrate, we estimate q(X) for the high school smoking example, where we take X to
be a node’s grade in school. Figure 34 below shows the on-node neighbor shares for smokers
vs. non-smokers for each grade separately. (Note that we still include students in other
grades when calculating the share of a node’s neighbors who smoke.)
10 1 − α + α2 = 1 − α2 is the chance that an agent acting in accordance with the threshold’s behavior
is correct (the agent acts according to the model, or is random and happens to pick the right action with
probability one half), and then α2 is the chance that an agent who is not acting in accordance with the
threshold is correctly matched.
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(a) Grade 9 (b) Grade 10
(c) Grade 11 (d) Grade 12
Figure 34: : Estimating qˆ for each of the grades 9,10,11, and 12 separately.
We estimate qˆ values of 0.58, 0.54, 0.39, and 0.39 for grade 9, 10, 11, and 12. So in
this example, younger students are less easily influenced to smoke by the smoking behaviors
of their friends. Using the grade specific thresholds, the share of agents of any gender
whose behavior the relative threshold model mispredicts falls marginally, from 0.36 under the
universal threshold above to 0.34 under the grade-specific thresholds, which corresponds to
mispredicting 24 fewer students – which again leads to an exponential increase in likelihood,
but is less dramatic. Still, it has a log-likelihood improvement p value of effectively 0.11
There may be additional demographics that would lead to additional improvements in fit,
the point here is simply to illustrate the potential approach.
9 Concluding Remarks
Although we have introduced the idea of ‘behavioral communities’, and the associated atomic
structure of a network, in the context of settings of coordination on a behavior, it is clear
11The test statistic is 2× ln(( 2−αα )24), which for values of α all the way up to being well above 2/3, leads
to a statistic above a χ2 at a .999 level with four degrees of freedom.
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that our approach provides a more general method of identifying communities in networks.
For instance, one could extend this to settings in which many actions are possible, or in
which behavior takes on a continuum of values. One would need to define when it is that a
group would be considered a convention. There are many metrics that could be used, and
even definitions that allow for overlapping conventions, which opens many avenues for future
research.
Indeed, there is a long list of questions that our approach opens: Are there critical
people in a community whose deletion would lead an atom to dissolve? How can a network
be recovered from observation of communities? How can algorithms for detecting the atomic
structure be improved? What do atoms look like in different types of networks? What are
appropriate extensions in multiplexed networks?
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Let us begin by showing that with a probability going to 1, all nodes have at least q of
their neighbors in their own block, and fewer than q of their neighbors outside of their block.
Consider some node i of type j. Let di(j
′, n) be i’s degree with nodes of type j′.
From Chernoff bounds it follows that
Pr ((1− δ)djj′(n) < di(j′, n) < (1 + δ)djj′(n)) > 1− 2e−δ2djj′ (n)/3.
Thus, looking across all j′:
Pr (∀j′ : [(1− δ)djj′(n) < di(j′, n) < (1 + δ)djj′(n)]) > (1− 2e−δ2minj′ djj′ (n)/3)|J |.
It follows that
Pr (∀j′ : [(1− δ)djj′(n) < di(j′, n) < (1 + δ)djj′(n)]) > 1− 2|J |e−δ2minj′ djj′ (n)/3.
Therefore,
Pr (∃j′ : [di(j′, n) < (1− δ)djj′(n) or di(j′, n) > (1 + δ)djj′(n)]) < 2|J |e−δ2minj′ djj′ (n)/3.
Thus the expected number of nodes for which their degree to some block lies outside of a
δ bound around the expected degree that they should have with that block satisfies (letting
ji denote i’s type):
E (#{i : ∃j′, [di(j′, n) < (1− δ)djij′(n) or di(j′, n) > (1 + δ)djij′(n)]}) < n2|J |e−δ
2minjj′ djj′ (n)/3
Examining the right hand side of the inequality, it follows that
n2|J |e−δ2minjj′ djj′ (n)/3 < n2|J |e−δ2f(n) log(n)/3 = n2|J |n−δ2f(n)/3 = 2|J |n1−δ2f(n)/3 → 0
Thus, the probability that all nodes have all their degrees with all blocks within a factor of
(1± δ) times the expected degree goes to 1, for any δ.
Pick δ, such that
(1 + δ) max
j 6=j′
djj′(n)
dj(n)
< min(Q) and (1− δ) min
j
djj(n)
dj(n)
> max(Q).
Consider the case in which Q ⊂ (q, q) [the other case holds by an analogous argument].
Thus, with a probability going to 1, all nodes have more than max(Q) of their links within
their own block and less than min(Q) in any other block. It follows that with a probability
going to 1, each block forms a Q-robust convention. Thus, C(Q, gn) is finer than Π(n) with
a probability going to 1.
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Proof of Corollary 1: Consider a growing sequence of stochastic block networks satisfying
the conditions of Theorem 1 and for which 3q − ε > 1 + q + ε+ j(n)
dj(n)
for some ε > 0.
By Theorem 1 we know that the partitions corresponding to C([q − ε, q + ε], gn) are
finer than Π(n) with a probability going to 1 as n grows. We show that with a probability
going to 1 all conventions are coarser than the blocks. We simply need to show that with a
probability going to 1 there is no convention that involves part of a block but not the whole
block.
As in Theorem 1, the probability that all nodes have all their degrees with all blocks
within a factor of (1± δ) times the expected degree goes to 1, for any δ. So, again, we argue
at the limit, but given the arbitrarily small δ > 0, and the ε > 0, the argument extends.
We show that any convention that intersects some block most contain that block.
Consider some convention S and node i ∈ S of type j. It has at most (1 − q)dj(n) of
its neighbors outside of its own block, and so in order to have (q − ε)dj(n) connections in
the convention, it has to have (2q − 1− ε)dj(n) neighbors within the convention in its own
block. This leaves j(n) − (2q − 1 − ε)dj(n) nodes in its block that could be outside of the
convention. These nodes outside of S but in j then have at least
qdj(n)− [j(n)− (2q − 1− ε)dj(n)] = (3q − 1− ε)dj(n)− j(n)
neighbors within S. It follows from the condition 3q − ε > 1 + q + ε+ j(n)
dj(n)
that
(3q − 1− ε)dj(n)− j(n) > (q + ε)dj(n)
and so the convention is not closed to those other nodes in the block, and hence must include
all other nodes in the block.
Proof of Theorem 2: We can decompose the network into an ER random graph with link
probability p(n) > (1 + ε)
(
t log(n)
n
)1/t
, plus extra links. The result is then a corollary of
Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3:
First we prove that if p(n) ≥ (1 + ε)
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
then there is no k-closed set.
We prove this at the threshold of (1 + ε)
(
k log(n)
n
)1/k
and thus it also holds for any larger
p since not having a k-closed set is a monotone property (e.g., see Bollobas (2001): if a
graph has the property then adding more links maintains the property). Take ε > 0 to be
small. Since k is fixed and ε is arbitrary, we equivalently work with
(
(1+ε)k log(n)
n
)1/k
.
First, note that the probability that some node has fewer than k connections to some set
of k nodes is
1− p(n)k.
The probability of having some set B of cardinality nB ≥ k be k-closed is at most[(
1− p(n)k)n−nB]bnbk c . (1)
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This is because a necessary condition for B to be closed is having all of its sets of k nodes
closed to nodes outside of B, and there are at least bnb
k
c disjoint sets of k nodes in B and
for which each of them being closed to nodes outside of B is an independent event So this
only counts those disjoint sets being closed to nodes outside of B, and hence is a loose upper
bound on the probability of B being closed.12
Next, note that the probability of having some set B of cardinality nB ≥ k be 1-closed
when the formation of a link happens with probability p′(n) is(
(1− p′(n))nB)n−nB .
We rewrite this as [(
(1− p′(n))k
)n−nB]nbk
. (2)
We show that when p(n) =
(
(1+ε)k log(n)
n
)1/k
and p′(n) = (1 + ε) log(n)
n
then the expression
in (1) is less than the expression in (2).
It is enough to show that
(
1− p(n)k) < [(1− p′(n))k]nbk /bnbk c . (3)
Noting that nb
k
/bnb
k
c ≤ 2, we verify that
1− p(n)k < (1− p′(n))2k .
At the designated values of p(n) and p′(n) this becomes
1− (1 + ε)k log(n)
n
<
(
1− (1 + ε) log(n)
n
)2
,
for which it is enough that
k(1 + ε) log(n)
n
> 2
(1 + ε) log(n)
n
.
This establishes that the probability that any set of at least k nodes is k-closed under this
p(n) is less than the corresponding probability that the same set is 1 closed under this p′(n).
This implies that the expected number of sets of at least k nodes that are k-closed under
this p(n) is less than the expected number of sets of nodes least k nodes that are 1-closed
under this p′(n).
12 The possibility of overlap in the sized-k subsets induces correlation between the events that the subsets
are closed to nodes outside of B and produces a much more complicated expression for the exact probability,
but this loose upper bound is easier to calculate and suffices for our proof.
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The second number is known to converge to 0 (see Bollobas (2001)13 ) Thus, the expected
number of sets of at least k nodes that are k-closed under this p(n) converges to 0. This
implies that the probability of having any such sets converges to 0, as claimed.
To complete the proof, we show that if p(n) =
(
(1−ε)k log(n)
n
)1/k
then the probability of
having at least one k-closed set of size k goes to one.
The probability that any particular set of k nodes is closed is
(1− pk)n−k.
Thus, the expected number of closed sets of size k is∑
B⊂N :#B=k
(1− pk)n−k =
(
n
k
)
(1− pk)n−k.
At the threshold this is (
n
k
)(
1− (1− ε)k log(n)
n
)n−k
.
For fixed k, this is of the order of
nkn−(1−ε)k = nkε →∞.
Thus, the expected number of k-closed sets of k nodes goes to infinity.
To complete the proof, we show that the variance of the number of k-closed sets of k
nodes compared to the mean is bounded. Once that is established, the fact that the expected
number of k-closed sets of k nodes goes to infinity implies that the probability that there
exists at least one k-closed set of k nodes exists goes to one can be proven using Chebychev’s
inequality by bounding the variance compared to the mean (See the proof on page 95 of
Jackson (2008)).
Therefore, letting Xn,k be the number of k closed sets of k nodes, we show that the
variance of Xn,k is a bounded multiple of E[Xn,k].
First, note that we can write
V ar(Xn,k) = E[Xn,k(Xn,k − 1)] + E[Xn,k]− E[Xn,k]2.
Next, note that E[Xn,k(Xn,k − 1)] is the expected number of ordered pairs of k closed sets
of k nodes, and that
E[Xn,k(Xn,k − 1)] ≤
(
n
k
)
(1− pk)n−k
k∑
k′=1
(
n− k
k′
)
(1− pk′)n−k−k′
13Usual statements of the threshold of connectivity of G(n, p) are in terms of the probability of connect-
edness. Here we are using the stronger statement that the expected number of components is going to 0
above the threshold. This can be pieced together from results in Bollobas (2001), but one can also find direct
treatments, for instance, see Section 4.5.2 in Blum, Hopcroft, and Kannan (2016).
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Here k′ is the number of nodes of the second set of nodes that does not overlap with the first,
and (1 − pk′)n−k−k′ ignores any possible overlapping links between the two sets of k nodes,
and so is a loose upper bound on the probability that a second set is closed conditional upon
the first one being closed. Thus,
V ar(Xn,k) ≤ E[Xn,k] +
(
n
k
)
(1− pk)n−k
(
k∑
k′=1
(
n− k
k′
)
(1− pk′)n−k−k′
)
−
(
n
k
)2
(1− pk)2n−2k
and so
V ar(Xn,k) ≤ E[Xn,k] + E[Xn,k]
(
k∑
k′=1
(
n− k
k′
)
(1− pk′)n−k−k′ −
(
n
k
)
(1− pk)n−k
)
.
This implies that14
V ar(Xn,k) ≤ E[Xn,k] + E[Xn,k]
(
k∑
k′=1
E[Xn−k,k′ ]− E[Xn,k]
)
.
Along the lines of our proof above,
∑k
k′=1E[Xn−k,k′ ]− E[Xn,k] is of the order of
k∑
k′=1
(n− k)k′ε − nkε,
and
k∑
k′=1
(n− k)k′ε − nkε ≤ (n− k)
kε
1− 1
(n−k)ε
− nkε = (n− k)kε
(
(n− k)kε
(n− k)ε − 1 −
nkε
(n− k)ε
)
< 0,
which completes the proof.
Distinguishing Homophily from Coordination
When estimating a threshold from an observed network and convention, there is an alterna-
tive hypothesis that could also potentially explain the data: homophily. This is a well-known
confound of correlated behaviors (e.g., see Aral, Muchnik, and Sundararajan (2009); Jackson,
Rogers, and Zenou (2017)). People with similar backgrounds and tastes tend to be linked to
each other. Thus, there could be strong correlation patterns in neighbors’ behaviors simply
because they have the same tastes without any influence from one to another.
14 Note that
(
n−k
k′
)
(1 − pk′)n−k−k′ < E[Xn−k,k′ ] since it is p =
(
(1−ε)k log(n)
n
)1/k
rather than(
(1−ε)k′ log(n−k)
n−k
)1/k′
that is used in the expression above, and that for large n, small ε, and k′ < k,(
(1−ε)k′ log(n−k)
n−k
)1/k′
<
(
(1−ε)k log(n)
n
)1/k
.
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With controlled experiments (e.g., random assignment of roommates as in Sacerdote
(2001)) or instruments under some conditions (Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009), Aral
and Nicolaides (2017)) one can test for influence directly as we discussed in the paper.
In the absence of such identification, faced with just observations of networks and behav-
ior, it is more challenging to distinguish homophily from influence.
To fix terms, we use ‘pure homophily’ to describe a world in which the probability that
two agents are linked to each other depends on some distance function of a vector of their
characteristics and their adoption decisions are a stochastic function of that vector, but in
which the adoption decision does not depend on the realized adoption decisions’ of one’s
neighbors. In contrast, by ‘pure coordination’, we mean a model in which each agent in a
network (one possibly formed under the influence of homophily) makes his adoption decision
as a function only of whether or not the share of his neighbors adopting the behavior is
above some common threshold q.15
Admitting homophily in our null hypothesis yields a more demanding test of coordination,
since homophily will generate positive coordination between neighbors’ adoption decisions
just as coordination does. Testing against homophily thus requires a more subtle analysis of
the structure that correlation takes.
It is impossible to entirely rule arbitrary models of homophily. For instance, suppose
we observe a convention S that matches perfectly with some threshold q. Another model
that could explain the data is that people who adopted are those who prefer to adopt, and
the other people preferred not to adopt. The associated ‘pure homophily’ model of network
formation is that all people who prefer to adopt also prefer to form links in such a way as to
end up with a network in which a fraction of at least q (respectively, more than t) of their
friends have the same preference; and conversely, all those who prefer not to adopt want to
be in a network in which less than a fraction q (respectively, fewer than t) of their friends
prefer to adopt. Beyond that, agents have no preferences over network structure.
This leads to the following straightforward observation:
Claim 1 Given any convention S associated with some network g and adoption threshold q
(or t), there is a pure homophily model of network formation that generates the same data.
The claim means that ironclad testing for causation of behavior will require controlled ex-
periments or valid instruments. Thus, making inferences from observed conventions requires
caution, especially with respect to policy.
Of course, the ‘pure homophily’ model underlying the extreme version of the claim above
is pathological.
If we restrict what are thought of as plausible models of homophily, then one can distin-
guish coordination behavior from homophily from an observed convention. The logic is as
follows.
15Of course, there could be both homophily and coordination, but to fix ideas we discuss testing for one
exclusively versus the other exclusively.
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Consider the following simple, but fairly general model of pure homophily. Nodes have
some real-valued unobserved characteristics denoted by θi and the probability that two nodes
i, j are linked is random but strictly decreasing in the distance |θi − θj|, holding the rest of
the network fixed.16 The probability of adoption is an increasing function of θi.
This model of homophily is empirically distinguishable from pure coordination. Under
this model of pure homophily, nodes’ adoption decisions are correlated with their neighbors’
adoption decisions conditional on a share of at least q of those neighbors adopting, for
any choice of q, whereas with coordination this correlation disappears if we condition on q.
The behavior of linked individuals is correlated under pure homophily, and that correlation
remains after conditioning on fractions of neighbors adopting as types are correlated via
network formation and seeing one of a pair’s behavior is still informative even conditional
upon others’ behaviors.
We outline a formal test of pure coordination versus pure homophily with our simple
version of homophily. Given a network G and a set of ”on” nodes S, let si = |Ni(G) ∩
S|/Ni(G).Define the statistic R as a function of a threshold q as:
R(q) = Corr(si, 1i∈S | si > q) + Corr(si, 1i∈S | si < q)
In words, the statistic R is the sum of the correlations between adoption and on-neighbor
shares conditional on nodes’ on-neighbor shares being above and below q. The idea of
the formal test is to examine the joint statistic (T,R). If there is no coordination, and
also no homophily in characteristics correlated with adoption, then for all q T (q) should
be large while R(q) should be small. If there is no coordination, but there is homophily
in characteristics correlated with adoption, then for all q Rˆ(q) should be large. Only pure
coordination should make it possible to find a q such that T (q) and R(q) are both small.
This suggests the following procedure:
First estimate q by minimizing H(q) = F (T (q), R(q)) for some function H which is
increasing in both T and R. Second, assuming some functional form for the linking prob-
abilities (as a decreasing function of |θi − θj|) and adoption probabilities (as an increasing
function of θi), use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters of these func-
tions along with the values θi. Third, compare the minimized value H(qˆ) to the distribution
of H generated by the maximum likelihood estimates (this may have to be bootstrapped
depending on the functional form assumptions) to obtain a p-value.
One could also fit a hybrid model in which one simultaneously estimates the latent space
of θi’s and the q’s as a function of that space. The idea would be that instead of simply
choosing a best fit q(Xi) function as we discussed above, one could fit a function of the form
q(Xi, θi) together with the assignment of θi’s based on the network and observed behaviors.
This would be a variaiton on the approach of Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013b) (see
also Jackson (2013); Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013a)) adapted to our setting.
16One can extend this to higher dimensional spaces of unobserved characteristics in the obvious manner,
with a partial order on monotonicity of actions in types.
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Seed Sets and Fragile Conventions
In this section we provide some alternative definitions of conventions and behavioral com-
munities.
Conventions may have subsets that still form a convention.
So, let us define various sorts of minimal conventions.
9.1 Self-Sustaining Seed Sets
First, let us define a q-self-sustaining seed set to be a subset S ⊂ N that is q-cohesive and
has no nonempty strict subset that is q-cohesive.
So, a self-sustaining seed set is a minimal set of nodes such that if they all adopt the
behavior then their best responses will continue to be to adopt the behavior. They may also
spread the behavior beyond their set, but that is not necessary as part of the definition.
The reason to have the “self-sustaining” part, is that it might be possible to seed a
convention with a smaller set if one can pay or force nodes to adopt a behavior and not
change back. Self-sustaining means that none of the nodes would change back if they are all
turned on, and so that requires that the group be q-cohesive.
Note that q-tight sets and self-sustaining seed sets can be distinct: there are clearly
self-sustaining seed sets that are not tight since closure is not required of a self-sustaining
seed set, and there are q-tight sets that are not self-sustaining seed sets since there can be a
subset that is cohesive (just not closed). For example, a triad with q < 1/2 is tight, but any
two nodes form a self-sustaining set.
Nonetheless, every q-tight set contains at least one self-sustaining seed set.
9.2 Fragile Conventions
Let us call a convention fragile if there exists some node in the convention, such that changing
that node to not adopting the behavior and then iterating on best responses would lead all
agents to change to not adopting the behavior - so changing just one node’s behavior can
completely eradicate the convention.
There are fragile conventions that are not tight, and vice versa.
For instance, the two conventions on the right side of Figure 3 are fragile but not tight.
There is a single node in each of those conventions that when changed leads the convention
to collapse, but there is still a subset of each convention that forms a convention (those on
the left of the figure) and so the conventions are not tight.
To see a tight convention that is not fragile, again consider a triangle with q < 1/2.
Changing any node’s behavior will not alter the other two, and so it is not fragile.
A self-sustaining seed set that is a convention is necessarily fragile. All subsets of a self-
sustaining seed set are not cohesive and so changing any node’s behavior will unravel the
convention.
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Moreover, every fragile convention contains a self-sustaining seed set.
Any convention that contains at least two disjoint tight subsets is not fragile.
There are conventions that contain overlapping but distinct tight subsets that are fragile.
Claim 2 Consider the set of nodes that can unravel a fragile convention: all of them need
to be part of any self-sustaining seed set that generates the convention.
proof: Any node that is taken out and can unravel a fragile convention is such that there
is no cohesive subset left that excludes that node, so any cohesive set must include all such
nodes.
9.3 Fragile and Seeding Community Structures
Let CF (Q, g) denote the finest σ-algebra whose elements are all coarser than all the fragile
conventions that are robust relative to Q.
Here, instead of grouping two nodes together if they act the same way in every convention,
they are grouped together if they act the same way in at least one fragile convention. Thus,
their behavior is sometimes tied together by the network structure, but does not have to
always be tied together.
The fragility of the convention is important as otherwise taking the union of two com-
pletely disjoint conventions would put people together without their behaviors really being
tied down by each other.
The finest elements of CF (Q, g) are referred to as fragile atoms.
One can also define a version which also requires that incorporates a self-seeding require-
ment.
For instance, let CFS(Q, g) denote the finest σ-algebra whose elements are all coarser
than all the fragile conventions that are robust relative to Q and which are q-self-sustaining
seed sets for all q ∈ Q.
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